horror stories, might not be acting so much as opinion leaders but merely transmitting the views of minority or pressure groups. The pharmaceutical industry, and the medical and pharmaceutical professions, had failed in communication in that they had not effectively countered reports containing half-truths and information created by pressure groups. There should be debate and freedom of speech, but the medical profession and the pharmaceutical industry needed to have the opportunity to present their case and not merely react to allegations. It was the patient, the most important individual in this context, who was most confused.
Sir Cecil Clothier KCB QC (Health Service Commissioner for England) then dealt with 'Communication and patients' complaints'. It was a truism that most complaints could be traced to failures in communication, either between the service or department of state and the citizen, or within the service or department. On admission to or discharge from hospital, there were possibilities of either not talking at all or not clearly enough to fellow members of staff, patients, relatives, or all three. The need to listen sympathetically and explain carefully had never been greater in a society taught by the media to question its fate and challenge the decisions of authority. Certain problems might be intractable, such as the barriers to communication erected against the receipt of bad news. There could be no general rule about giving full information before obtaining consent to treatment, but each case ought to be decided individually. Medicine apart, we had a duty in common humanity to talk to each other and do it well.
HUGH L'ETANG Post-marketing monitoring of drugs'
In his introductory welcome at a meeting on 10 January 1985, which was designed to foster collaboration amongst a range of disciplines pertinent to the post-marketing monitoring of drugs, Dr M C Pike (Imperial Cancer Research Fund) reminded us of the type of practical problem liable to undermine the most careful study of adverse reactions. In his investigations of oral contraceptives and breast cancer it has proved very difficult to identify retrospectively which of the 125 formulations of contraceptive pill was prescribed. A restriction on the number of available formulations and a simple but clear method of identification would have been invaluable.
Regulatory view
As Chairman of the Safety, Efficacy and Adverse Reactions Sub-committee of the Committee on the Safety of Medicines (CSM), Professor D G Grahame-Smith (Oxford University) is in an ideal position to describe the current regulatory view. The terms of reference of the CSM include both the passive role of advising the government on the safety, quality and efficacy of medicines, and also the active role of promoting the collection and And finally, what action should the CSM take? At the heart of this investigatory work lies the quality of the data on the basis of which judgment is to be exercised. To provide adequate data for new drugs, three systems are required: an alerting system to initiate suspicions; a back-up system to validate the reality of suspected adverse reactions; an appraisal system for quantitative risk assessment. For older drugs only the third system is required so that risk may be assessed under changing circumstances.
The difficulty of detecting an adverse reaction can be related to two factors -the relative frequency with which the reaction is induced by the drug (or the additional incidence of the reaction among treated patients), and the background or spontaneous incidence of the induced illness. It is easiest to detect common adverse reactions which otherwise occur rarely, and hardest, if not impossible, to detect rare adverse reactions which otherwise occur commonly. In principle the investigation of the risk/benefit ratio for a drug is a never-ending process. Professor Grahame-Smith accepted that the decision, in principle, as to how much information on safety in clinical use was really necessary before full marketing of a drug, was a problematical one. Against the problems of safety one always had to balance the benefits accruing from efficacy. As a society we also had to nurture research in new and effective medicines which, like it or not, is rendered possible by the profits on drug sales. If over-excessive and obsessional requirements on safety in widespread use (say 20 000 patients) for a medicine are demanded before marketing, then the cost and time involved will destroy profits, kill research and deprive society of the benefits of new medicines. There is therefore much to be gained by adopting a reasonable balance between safety and efficacy before marketing, which Professor Grahame-Smith thought we had presently, coupled with efficient and competent post-marketing surveillance systems.
Viewfrom industry Dr E Snell (Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry) followed with a perspective from the viewpoint of the pharmaceutical industry. In his opening remarks he pointed out that, whereas the CSM had limited financial resources to investigate an enormous range of drugs, industry devoted large resources to each drug and was thus better placed to seek out information on adverse reactions. More is achieved pre-marketing than is often recognized. For example, much of our current knowledge concerning the adverse effects of benoxaprofen can be found, in essence, in the original data-sheet written at the time of the launch of the drug. However, it is important that we learn to expect new problems to arise after marketing, rather than be surprised by them.
There is a wide variety of ways in which postmarketing monitoring is currently pursued, ranging from informal spontaneous reports to formal clinical trials. Some of these methods help to quantify the incidence of disease amongst specific drug users and some help to quantify the degree of drug use amongst those with a specific disease. Others give no quantifiable information. Additionally, adverse reactions themselves vary enormously in the ease with which they can be discovered -as exemplified by thalidomide, which was relatively easy, and the possible relationship between breast cancer and reserpine, which has proved difficult.
Dr Snell summanzed the shortcomings of the various methods. Reliance on spontaneous reports is insensitive and can lead to underestimation of the incidence of an adverse reaction. Records are often poor, which makes later follow up difficult or impossible, and causality is hard to assess. Published reports can be misinterpreted and lead to unnecessary public alarm. The CSM's 'yellow card' system is subject to the methodological defects of spontaneous reporting, and yet the 1961 and 1976 in which 9500 women were allocated to oral contraceptives or vaginal contraceptives (Potts et al. 1982) . There were serious problems of non-adherence and poor follow up which rendered this early study a missed opportunity. The second study, started in 1968 and conducted by the Royal College of General Practitioners (1974) , involved 1400 GPs: 23 000 women on oral contraceptives were originally compared with a similar number of controls, but only 19 000 women are now under observation because of population mobility. Nevertheless, this is a highly successful study and a valuable model. In the next study (also highly successful) of 17000 women, conducted jointly by Oxford University and the Family Planning Association, the involvement of family planning clinics prevents the methodology from being generalized to other classes of drugs (Vessey et al. 1976) .
The Walnut Creek Contraceptive Drug Study (Ramcharan 1974) , started in 1968, included 16 500 female members of the Kaiser health plan in the USA. Recruitment took place at a general health check. The women turned out to be rather old on average and were mostly ex-users of the pill. This project is no longer funded and was overambitious in the range of data collected. The American Nurses Study, started in 1976, involves postal recruitment of 120000 nurses with postal follow up (Rosenberg et al. 1980 ). This model is interesting in that it capitalizes on the motivation arising from the specialist knowledge of nurses and is relatively cheap, although it is too soon to evaluate its success. Finally, Professor Vessey described his study of the safety of cimetidine (Colin-Jones et al. 1983 ). This study compared 10 000 treated patients with matched controls initially for a period of one year. The patients were identified by the Prescription Pricing Authority in Nottingham and retail pharmacists in three other centres. Only 1% of patients were lost at one year. The results of this study are alarming at first sight, with raised incidences of a whole range of causes of death, such as cancer of the lung, lymphoma, accidents and violence among cimetidine takers. However, on thorough investigation these could all be explained. For example, excessive alcohol consumption is associated with death by accident or violence and also with gastric ailments; some treatments for cancer are gastrotoxic. The lesson to be drawn is that the interpretation of studies such as this needs to be sophisticated. Moreover, their expense may well preclude wide use.
Professor D G McDevitt (University of Dundee) described a cohort study carried out on Tayside using record linkage (Crombie et al. 1984) . By allocating a unique community health number to each Tayside resident, patient details can be linked with hospital discharges, child development and mortality data. In a study of cimetidine, prescriptions written over a ninemonth period were obtained from the Edinburgh prescription pricing bureau. Of these, threequarters could be allocated to a community health number. Controls were chosen matched by sex, age, and general practitioner. The morbidity data obtained were complex: of the 3800 cimetidinetakers, 900 had at least one hospital admission as did 400 of the controls. Among the 'takers' there was an excess of hospital admissions for diseases of the digestive system, GI tract cancers and cancers of the lymphatic and haematopoietic system. The major problem with linkage studies is how to interpret such results: drug-takers are a highly selected group and non-causal disease associations are to be expected. A better control group would be a group of takers of other drugs for the same or similar conditions, always bearing in mind that new drugs tend to be prescribed to a selected subgroup of sufferers from a particular condition.
Comparison of pre-and post-prescription morbidity can help to identify non-causal associations. Professor McDevitt summarized the advantages and disadvantages of record linkage studies for post-marketing surveillance and stressed that much larger populations than Tayside (population 400 000) such as the Medicaid or Finnish record linkage populations, were necessary to identify uncommon adverse drug reactions (ADRs) causing hospitalization or congenital malformations. Such studies are particularly valuable for studying delayed-onset ADRs.
The final speaker of the afternoon was Professor W H W Inman (Southampton University) who gave us a perspective of the risks from adverse drug reactions. Rare events could only be monitored by a system such as the 'yellow cards' used in the UK. The vast majority of 'events' reported by prescription-event monitoring are unrelated to the drugs under study. Professor
Inman compared his study of ranitidine with Professor Vessey's study of cimetidine (PEM News 1983) . He pointed out the similar low death rate from peptic ulcer in each study, a potential benefit of treatment which should not be overlooked. Preliminary results from studies of non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs suggested a 1 in 10000 risk of death from an adverse drug reaction in old age compared to a 1 in 100 risk of death from the untreated disease. Professor Inman suggested that the withdrawal of Opren and Zomax was based on anecdotal evidence and media panic and did not balance benefit with risk. Communication of quantitative risk per unit time might lead to more rational decisions (Inman 1985) .
In the discussion following the meeting, Professor Vessey pointed out that it is relatively easy to reach a decision to ban a drug where other similarly effective drugs are available, although such a decision might be taken on inadequate evidence. The CSM relates reported ADRs to the number of prescriptions written, and concentrates attention on ADR rates at similar stages of marketing when making comparisons between drugs. Present systems of surveillance are, strictlyspeaking, hypothesis-generating and should be followed by epidemiological studies to test these hypotheses. This point was followed up by Dr J Weatherall who pointed out that adverse reactions were often too rare to be studied adequately even if money for rapid studies was available.
Dr Sutherland summed up by re-stating the major problem of identifying ADRs: that of finding a strategy for rapid hypothesis-testing once an adverse reaction is postulated. 
